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Do Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behaviour? Evidence from Great Britain and Canada

CHRISTOPHER KAM

Are parliamentary parties cohesive because leaders successfully impose discipline on their MPs or because MPs prefer – hence support – the same policies as their leaders do? If the latter is correct, and party cohesion is produced largely by members' concordant preferences, then models that explain cohesion as a function of the disciplinary mechanisms available to parties once the MP is in Parliament (for example, the distribution of patronage or the threat of de-selection) are not useful. This article uses British and Canadian MPs' responses to candidate surveys to estimate MPs' positions on a variety of ideological dimensions and then shows that MPs' preferences on these ideological dimensions only partially explain how often they vote against their parties. Indeed, even after one controls for an MP's ideological preferences, party affiliation remains a powerful predictor of the MP's loyalty or dissent – suggesting that party discipline does, in fact, contribute to cohesion. Additional tests indicate that these results are not spurious.

Political scientists tend to view legislative behaviour as the result of the interaction of preferences and institutional rules.¹ A great deal of the work on party cohesion follows this analytical framework with electoral, parliamentary *and* party rules being seen to play critical roles in manufacturing cohesion.² However, not all scholars agree that parties' rules matter. In particular, there is debate over whether parties constrain, or indeed have the capacity to constrain, their members' behaviour. Krehbiel, for example, argues that it is not clear *a priori* whether party rules force their members to vote together *in spite of their disagreement* about policy,

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or whether they vote together simply *because they already agree* over policy.³ If the latter is true, then cohesion is largely independent of parties. The immediate issue then, is whether parties alter their members' preferences in ways that are observable and meaningful (that is, in ways that alter legislative outcomes).⁴ At stake here is how – or perhaps even whether – models of legislative behaviour should consider the institutional features of political parties.

To date this 'parties vs. preferences' debate has centred almost exclusively on the US Congress,⁵ for fairly obvious reasons. Compared to parliamentary parties, American parties are not highly cohesive and this relative lack of cohesion invites scepticism about their ability to compel disciplined behaviour from their members. Conversely, the very high level of cohesion displayed by parliamentary parties implicitly discourages scholars from questioning their ability to enforce discipline among their members, to wit: if parliamentary parties are highly cohesive, it must be because they can and do enforce discipline.⁶ There are at least four problems with this line of reasoning. First, parliamentary parties are less cohesive than one might think;⁷ there is unexplained variance in the data. Second, it ignores the fact that cohesion produced by members' shared preferences is observationally equivalent to cohesion produced by a party's rules or actions (that is to say, by discipline). Third, as a result of this observational equivalence, the failure to test Krehbiel's model carries with it potentially high opportunity costs. If, for example, Krehbiel is correct and party cohesion is produced largely by members' preferences, then models that explain cohesion as a function of the disciplinary mechanisms available to parties once the MP is in Parliament (for example, the distribution of patronage and the threat of de-selection) are not all that useful. Time would be better spent thinking about how well pre-election mechanisms (such as recruitment procedures and central office control of local pre-selections) allow party leaders to weed out candidates with uncongenial preferences. One could, of course, forgo testing Krehbiel's theory altogether and explain cohesion as a function of both pre- and post-election party mechanisms. There is still an opportunity cost here, however: any effort expended building complicated models of cohesion is wasted if a simpler model, perhaps one that ignored parties entirely, produces identical results. Fourth, and most importantly, the implicit belief that parliamentary parties can and do compel or organise cohesion could just be wrong. However, in the absence of considered evidence it is not clear whether this position or Krehbiel's is the correct one.

It is for precisely these reasons that it is desirable to address the 'parties vs. preferences' debate directly and comparatively and in a parliamentary setting.⁸ This article takes up that task, assessing the degree to which

parliamentary behaviour in Britain and Canada is consistent with a preference-driven model of legislative behaviour. More specifically, the article examines whether MPs' decisions to dissent from or remain loyal to their parties follow directly from their unconstrained ideological preferences. In the aggregate this amounts to asking whether the high levels of party cohesion that one observes in the British and Canadian parliaments are simple functions of parliamentarians' preferences. The article is divided into five parts. The first section justifies the choice of countries. The second section presents a short explanation of Krehbiel's preference-based model. The third section describes the data and methods used to test this model and the tests themselves follow in the fourth section. The final section summarises the results and presents the article's conclusions. The general result is that MPs' behaviour – hence party cohesion – cannot be adequately explained by their preferences alone. Parliamentary behaviour appears to depend on preferences *and* parties.

WHY BRITAIN AND CANADA – AND NOT GERMANY, FOR EXAMPLE?

There are several potential advantages to using a comparative research design in place of a case study, among them greater variance in the relevant variables, stronger statistical control and greater external validity. Whether these potential advantages are realised depends heavily on the nature of the sample from which any comparisons are drawn. For instance, it is generally desirable to employ a sample that is representative of the population of cases; this is what allows one to draw accurate inferences about the population on the basis of the sample. Of course, 'representativeness' is neither the sole criterion of a 'good' sample nor is it something found only in large-N random samples. Comparativists also value samples that do not invite 'conceptual stretching', that is variation in a variable's substantive meaning across cases.⁹ In Great Britain, for example, voting in a division (Westminster terminology for a roll-call vote) involves having one's name checked off a list as one passes through a doorway from a lobby. The procedure is similar in the German *Bundestag* save for the critical difference that legislators' names are not recorded. This means that in Westminster voting is a public act while in the *Bundestag* it is an anonymous one.¹⁰ There are further institutional differences: the *Bundestag*'s rules allow parliamentarians to register formal abstentions while Westminster's standing orders do not. British MPs vote either 'yea' or 'nay' or absent themselves from the division altogether.¹¹ Absence is not equivalent to abstention, however, because an MP's absence may or may not be sanctioned by the party whip. A naive comparison of German and British

MPs' voting behaviour risks disguising these important qualitative differences. A simple solution is to adopt a 'most similar systems' approach, limiting comparisons to culturally and institutionally similar countries.¹²

In this regard, Britain and Canada are an excellent sample. For historical reasons the countries operate broadly similar systems of majoritarian parliamentary government.¹³ In these systems majoritarian electoral rules, constitutional conventions and standing orders make it possible for a single party to form and control the Cabinet – providing that it votes cohesively in Parliament. These institutional arrangements make party cohesion the *fundamental* strategic problem of majoritarian parliamentary government. Coalition and presidential systems present political parties with additional strategic challenges, notably government formation and divided government, but these problems are ancillary to the maintenance of party unity. The notion of divided government presupposes the idea that one party controls the legislative branch while another party holds the presidency. Party cohesion supplies that control. In a coalition system, a party that is not cohesive is unlikely to be considered a reliable coalition partner.¹⁴ From this perspective the fundamental strategic problem of majoritarian parliamentary government is a strict subset of the strategic problems of coalition or presidential government. In this sense, majoritarian parliamentary government is government stripped to its essentials, a fact that allows one to study party cohesion free from the added complications of coalition or presidential government, without making it irrelevant to these two more complex forms of government.

A comparative research design certainly has its epistemological advantages, but they do not come free of charge. In terms of time and data, the marginal cost of adding an extra observation (for example, another national parliament or an additional parliamentary term in each of these countries) to the sample is extremely high. Consequently, attention is limited here to just two Parliaments, the 35th Canadian Parliament (1993–97) and 51st British Parliament (1992–97). These Parliaments were attractive cases primarily because a good deal of data on MPs' voting records and policy opinions had already been collected by other scholars.¹⁵ Without these existing data sources the project would simply have been too resource-intensive to carry out.

A PREFERENCE-DRIVEN MODEL OF PARTY COHESION

Krehbiel's contention is that it is not clear whether members vote with their parties because of their preferences or despite them. The argument can be illustrated with the aid of a simple spatial model. Suppose that MPs' preferences over policy can be represented as points on the real line and that




FIGURE 1
HYPOTHETICAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF IDEAL POINTS IN TWO PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES

the densities of the ideal points of MPs of parties A and B are as shown in Figure 1. Suppose further that MPs vote for the option closest to their ideal point.¹⁶ Now, because the ideal point of every member of A is closer to party A's preferred policy of x , all members of A vote for x . All members of B vote for y for exactly the same reason. (The cutpoint is the midpoint between x and y , the point at which an MP is indifferent between the two proposals.) It is unclear in this situation if party members are voting according to their parties' dictates or simply their own preferences. If, however, the ideal points of some members of A and B are closer to the opposing party's position (those with preferences in the shaded area in Figure 1b), then some pressure must be brought to bear on these outlying MPs to force them to vote as the party wishes. Krehbiel's concern is that parties cannot, or at least cannot be shown to, do this. Indeed, unless parliamentarians' preferences are measured directly, one cannot know whether cohesion results because of a congenial configuration of preferences (Figure 1a), or because parties have managed to enforce discipline despite their members' preferences (Figure 1b).

Students of parliamentary politics and parties may see in Krehbiel's model an altogether fanciful description of how parliamentary parties operate. Krehbiel's model is certainly a very parsimonious – one might even say spare – explanation of legislative behaviour and party cohesion. Nevertheless, it does tell one what conditions are necessary and sufficient for party cohesion (a certain distribution of preferences within and between parties) and which others (party rules, for example) are unnecessary. In this regard, Krehbiel's theory is quite complete and indeed Krehbiel himself saw no reason why his model could not be applied successfully to British parliamentary politics.¹⁷ This is a significant claim to make of such a parsimonious model – that it can explain not only US Congressional politics but British (and by extension, Canadian, Australian, French, German and so on) parliamentary politics too. This claim, or more precisely the model that generates this claim, deserves to be confronted with evidence.

DATA AND METHODS

In theory, only two things are required to test Krehbiel's model: a measure of parliamentarians' behaviour (the dependent variable) and a measure of their ideological preferences (the independent variable). (By assumption, parties are not necessary for cohesion.) If MPs' preferences are electorally induced, as Krehbiel assumes them to be, then it should not be necessary to take separate account of MPs' electoral environments or circumstances.¹⁸ Presumably, preferences held at any particular time have been induced by – and therefore reflect – the states of these other variables up to that time.

Measuring Behaviour

At the outset of this section it is useful to differentiate between cohesion and dissent. *Cohesion* refers to the degree to which members of the same party can be observed to work together in pursuance of the party's goals.¹⁹ *Dissent*, on the other hand, occurs when a party member acts against his or her party. Dissent may be viewed as the inverse of cohesion, but it is so only in a conceptual sense because cohesion and dissent are measured in quite different ways. Cohesion, for example, applies to parties not individuals and so is typically measured with Rice indices, counts of 'party' votes or some other aggregate measure of a party's voting solidarity. Dissent may be measured at the party-level, but it is more naturally applied to individuals.²⁰ Dissent encompasses a range of activities including speaking out publicly against one's own party, absenting oneself from a parliamentary vote without permission, voting against one's party and – at the limit – defection. All of these measures can alter legislative outcomes, but dissent broadly defined can have pernicious downstream effects on a party even if it does not immediately alter legislative outcomes.²¹ John Major himself worried that his government's policy initiatives were drowned out by his party's internecine squabbles.²² The electoral demise of the Major government can be taken as empirical evidence of the electoral consequences of backbench dissent.²³ Dissent can also re-ignite a collective action problem within the party.²⁴ All MPs have an electoral incentive to distance themselves from unpopular party policies, but – particularly when their party is in government and needs the confidence of the House, though also when it is in opposition and trying to project itself as an alternative government – would like their colleagues to remain loyal. Party discipline solves this dilemma because it allows MPs to claim that their party compelled them to vote the party line or that the vote was about the government's survival. When an MP dissents, s/he robs her colleagues of these excuses. This undermines the electoral prospects of loyal MPs (hence the party at large) and creates tension inside the party caucus. Dissent can also destabilise a party's leadership. Again, the experience of the Major government illustrates this dynamic. Dissent is important then because it may lead to the direct defeat or amendment of government bills, the replacement of one set of leaders with another, or to electoral misfortune.

The principal dependent variable of this analysis is the number of dissenting votes that an MP casts against his or her party during the observed parliamentary terms. An MP casts a dissenting vote whenever s/he votes contrary to the instructions of his or her frontbench.²⁵ However, at various times the analysis also makes use of MPs' rates of absenteeism and, if applicable, their defections. Absenteeism is measured simply by noting

whether or not a member votes on a whipped vote. (As noted above sanctioned and unsanctioned absences are indistinguishable, but this problem is dealt with below.) Defections, whether to another party or simply to an independent status, are tracked through parliamentary and media records.

Measuring Preferences

Parliamentarians' preferences are far harder to estimate than their behaviour; the latter after all can be observed, but the former only inferred. A common but problematic strategy is to use some type of statistical technique to estimate legislators' preferences from past votes.²⁶ At the limit, using votes to explain votes is, as Jackson and Kingdon note, simply tautological.²⁷ In addition, voting patterns may not be a good proxy for members' ideological preferences. If, for example, parties can and do influence members' votes, then votes reveal preferences that are endogenous, not exogenous, to parties. Alternatively, party leaders may only allow votes on which the parties occupy clearly divergent ideological positions (as in Figure 1a). In either case, observed votes suffer from a severe and pervasive form of selection bias, prompting doubts that unbiased estimates of preferences can be recovered from voting records.²⁸ There are practical as well as theoretical problems with inferring members' preferences from their votes. NOMINATE, and indeed other statistical methods, require some variance in members' voting records before they can produce estimates of legislators' ideological preferences. This is not a problem when these techniques are applied to voting data from the US Congress where party cohesion is low relative to most parliamentary systems. However, in the British and Canadian parliamentary systems, this sort of variance cannot be taken for granted.²⁹

To avoid the problems associated with vote-based estimation techniques, MPs' ideological preferences are estimated from their responses to candidate surveys conducted in each country in the elections just prior to the parliaments that are examined.³⁰ The great advantage of this method is that MPs' responses to surveys conducted just before the beginning of a parliament are clearly exogenous to their subsequent behaviour and to parliamentary and party institutions (including party discipline, agenda-setting, log-rolls and the like).³¹ The surveys also contained many of the same questions, further facilitating comparability across the two countries. Preferences were dealt with as follows:

1. The responses to the policy question were factor analysed for all major party candidates. Each national survey produced a clear left-right dimension, but secondary ideological dimensions were also visible.³² In

addition to the left-right dimensions, two of these secondary dimensions were used, a constitutional dimension that taps British MPs' attitudes toward the devolution of power from Westminster and a social morality dimension that taps Canadian MPs' attitudes toward non-traditional lifestyles.

2. The factor solutions were then used to construct additive ideological scales. That is, items that loaded heavily on a factor were taken, each item was scaled so that it ranged between zero and one from left to right and then the items were added together.³³
3. Finally, multiple imputation was used to impute the scores of MPs who failed to respond to the candidate surveys. Imputed scores were not constrained to fall on the scale intervals and so after imputation the scales were, for all intents and purposes, continuous.³⁴


Once MPs' preferences were estimated, the party medians and the cutpoints between the parties were calculated. The reality in these parliaments is that the Cabinet – that is the *leadership* of the governing party – has a near monopoly over the legislative agenda and policy-making. Opposition backbenchers have somewhat more say in their party's policy direction, but their frontbenchers are still relatively powerful by comparison. Thus it can be assumed that a party's policy position (the empirical counterparts of the x_s and y_s in Figure 1) is defined by its frontbench. A further assumption is that within the frontbench, the collective policy choice is determined by the median frontbench MP. Hence, a party's policy positions (on the left-right, constitutional, or social morality scales) are equal to the policy positions of the median frontbench MP.³⁵ Once party medians are defined, the cutpoints (the midpoints between the parties) are easy to compute. The only difficulty occurs when there is more than one opposition party. In these cases each opposition parties' cutpoint is defined with respect to the governing party (not to another opposition party).

EMPIRICAL TESTS

An Initial Look at the Relationship between Preferences and Dissent

Scatter plots of dissent by ideological position in each parliament (Figures 2a and 2b) are a good starting point. The graphs convey to the reader a number of useful pieces of information: the ideological distribution of MPs, a rough sense of how often and how many MPs engage in dissent and the overall nature of the relationship between preferences and dissent. Figure 2a shows the situation in the British House of Commons. Just as one expects, the Conservative MPs are on the political right and Labour MPs on the left.

FIGURE 2a
IDEOLOGICAL POSITION AND DISSENT IN THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1992-97




Almost 60 per cent of the MPs cast at least one dissenting vote, a little more than ten per cent cast more than 20 (the right *x*-axis translates these numbers into a percentage of all whipped divisions). Dissent is therefore a common activity in the British Commons and indeed 20.8 per cent of all whipped divisions in the 51st Parliament witnessed some degree of dissent. This emphasises the fact that while cohesion is high in the British Commons, it is not perfect.

Insofar as Krehbiel's hypothesis of preference-driven behaviour is concerned, note that: 1) dissent in the Conservative Party is centred about the party median, not about the cutpoint where Krehbiel's theory predicts it to be; and 2) that the bulk of dissent in the Labour Party occurs on the far side of the Labour Party's median. If Labour MPs vote their preferences, that is for proposals nearest to them, then without question they should prefer the Labour (median) position to the Conservative position. These MPs should not then be dissenting – but they are. Moreover, the further left the Labour MP, the more dissenting votes s/he appears to cast. Naturally, there are ready rebuttals to these observations. First, a great many Conservative MPs clustered together near the bottom of the party median cast very few dissenting votes, a fact that fits a preference-driven model of party cohesion. Second, one might argue that left-leaning Labour MPs are voting against New Labour's drive toward the political centre. That is to say, on some issues the *status quo* may be at or just beyond the Labour median and Labour leftists may simply be voting against efforts of both right-leaning Labour MPs and the Conservative Party to move the *status quo* on these issues towards the right. This is actually quite plausible. Very frequently in the British Parliament the Opposition frontbench will simply abstain from voting in a division and allow the Government to have its way unopposed. It may be the case that left-leaning Labour MPs are defying their frontbench by participating in these divisions (they may well be the ones forcing them), but still voting against the Government.³⁶ Under these conditions, the evidence could fit a preference-driven model of behaviour.

Figure 2b is the Canadian counterpart to Figure 2a. Dissent is less common than in the British Commons, but it is still observed frequently: just over half of Canadian MPs cast at least one dissenting vote, a little more than five per cent of MPs cast ten or more and in total 16.3 per cent of divisions during the 35th Canadian Parliament witnessed dissent.³⁷ The party alignments appear sensible. The Reform Party is well off to the right while the Liberals and Bloc Quebecois are just to the left of centre. Again, it appears that the opinion data from candidate surveys and the multiple imputation of missing data have not led us astray. There are three obvious discrepancies between the data and the expectations of a preference-driven model of parliamentary behaviour:

FIGURE 2b
IDEOLOGICAL POSITION AND DISSENT IN THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1993-97




1. Reform MPs tend to dissent more as they move closer toward the political centre and get closer to the governing Liberal Party. This result meshes with Krehbiel's theory, but not perfectly because most Reform dissidents do not fall beyond the Liberal-Reform cutpoint. In other words, Reform MPs are cross-voting despite being ideologically closer to their own party than any other.³⁸
2. Many Bloc Quebecois MPs fall beyond the cutpoints (indicating that they are closer to another party's median position), but they rarely dissent. Thus even though a preference-driven model would predict these MPs to act against their party, for some reason most Bloc MPs do not.
3. Finally, among Liberal MPs one observes many MPs who share the same ideological position but behave in very different ways, some dissenting a lot, others remaining very loyal. If only preferences guide behaviour, and preferences are identical, then behaviour too should be identical – but it is not.

One cannot rebut this evidence in the same way as the British evidence (that is, by pointing to a pattern of Opposition abstentions). Canadian opposition parties almost never abstain from voting in a division and so it is difficult to argue that the dissenting votes of Canadian opposition MPs reflect only dissatisfaction with the Government's position.³⁹

The overall impression that one gets from these scatter plots is that the relationship between preferences and dissent is not as clear cut as one might expect given a simple preference-driven model of behaviour. Measurement error is always a possible explanation for these results and it could take several forms. First, the candidate surveys and the multiple imputation efforts may have provided inaccurate estimates of MPs' ideological positions. This is not likely, however. The estimates of party positions (derived from MPs' preferences) have considerable face validity insofar as they closely resemble previous analyses of the ideological configurations of these party systems.⁴⁰ In addition, it is clear from Figures 2a and 2b that dissent is not clustered near the cutpoints. Indeed, were one to move MPs' ideal points (hence party medians and cutpoints) a point or a point and a half to the left or the right, the general picture that emerges from these data would not change substantially. Finally, previous research on multiple imputation has shown that when the rate of missing data is low (as it is here), even a few imputations will return unbiased parameter estimates and confidence intervals.⁴¹ Nevertheless, there are additional, more sophisticated, reasons as to why the scatter plots might constitute misleading evidence against a preference-driven model of parliamentary behaviour and so four additional tests have been considered.

FIGURE 3
DISSENT BY PERCEIVED IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE FROM OWN PARTY IN THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1992-97



Dissent and the Subjective Perception of MP-Party Distance

A more plausible source of error than simple measurement error is the left-right scale itself. Recall that party medians are assumed to be the ideal point of the median frontbencher. This assumption is theoretically grounded, but that does not mean that MPs see things this way. They may well perceive parties to be located at somewhat different points on the scale. It is not necessarily the case, then, that two MPs at the same ideological location see themselves as equidistant from the parties' medians. This could explain why MPs at the same ideological position behave in different ways.

Instead of locating MPs on the constructed left-right scale and setting the parties' medians equal to the frontbench median, it may be better to measure how far MPs perceive themselves to be from the parties and then predict their behaviour from the subjective assessments of their distances from each party. A limited test of this sort is possible in the British case because the British survey asked candidates to place themselves, their parliamentary parties and their leaders on a seven point left-right scale. Unfortunately, British candidates were not asked to place opposing parties or leaders on the scale, so we cannot compute perceived cutpoints. Nevertheless, *ceteris paribus*, the farther an MP perceives herself to be from her/his party, the more likely it is that s/he will fall beyond her subjective cutpoint and the more likely s/he is to dissent. If one assumes that all British MPs see the Conservative Party to the right of the Labour Party, the hypothesis can be stated more precisely: The greater a Conservative (Labour) MP's perceived leftward (rightward) distance from his party, the more likely s/he is to dissent. Conservative (Labour) MPs perceiving themselves to be at or to the right (left) of their party's ideal point should not dissent.

To test this hypothesis we first subtract MPs' placements of their parties from their self-placements. As the scale runs from one on the far left to seven on the far right, a positive score indicates that the MP lies to the right of his or her party, a negative score, that he or she lies to the left of the party. The larger the score in absolute terms, the further the MP perceives himself or herself to be from his or her party. MPs' scores are then plotted against the number of dissenting votes that they have cast. Figure 3 shows the resulting graph. Again, the expectation is that Conservative dissidents will fall in the upper left quadrant and Labour dissidents in the upper right quadrant. Non-dissenting MPs should fall along the horizontal axis; Conservative MPs to the right, Labour MPs to the left.

The graph does not conform to this pattern. Conservative dissidents are scattered evenly on both sides of the zero-point, Labour dissidents are more heavily concentrated in the upper left – not right – quadrant and the bulk of Conservative loyalists (that is, MPs who never dissent) are to the

left, not the right of the party. In addition, there is a noticeable concentration of dissidents at the zero-point, the point at which the MP and his or her party share ideal points. Regression estimates (not shown) back up the visual data. In sum, this evidence, like the scatter plots presented above, does not uncover a systematic relationship between MPs' preferences and dissent.

Alternative Dimensions of Political Conflict: Cross-voting on European Union in the British House of Commons, 1992–97


A second plausible objection to the left-right scale is that it does not accurately reflect the multi-dimensional nature of issues that come before these parliaments. So far the tests have been based on MPs' positions on a left-right dimension. This approach is justified on two grounds:

1. A left-right dimension centring on economic issues such as income redistribution, privatisation, labour market flexibility and so on, is the dominant political cleavage in these and many other countries.⁴²
2. The issue space of most legislatures is typically of low dimensionality and is often dominated by a single dimension.⁴³

In tandem these facts suggest the left-right dimension is likely to be the dominant issue dimension in any legislature. Nevertheless, there are alternative dimensions of political conflict. The danger here is that we have used MPs' left-right positions to predict dissenting votes that may, in fact, be related to an alternative dimension of political conflict. If many dissenting votes are cast on issues that fall along this alternative dimension, then to the extent that this dimension is weakly correlated to the left-right dimension, the relationship between MPs' left-right positions and dissenting votes will appear to be random. One can imagine this sort of dynamic occurring in the 51st British Parliament (the Parliament examined here) because approximately a quarter of the divisions witnessing dissent concerned the European Union (EU), an issue over which traditional left-right political arguments run up against debates over the desirability of ceding national sovereignty to Brussels.

A clearer picture of the relationship between preferences and behaviour might emerge if divisions were grouped by subject matter. One could then examine the connection between MPs' voting decisions in a particular group of divisions and their scores on ideological scales designed to assess preferences on that particular subject. In the British case (where, as I suggest above, the problem is probably quite serious) this can be accomplished by looking at how British MPs' preferences over the decentralisation of power from Westminster predict dissent in just those

FIGURE 4
EU DISSENT BY POSITION ON DEVOLUTION IN THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1992-97



divisions that concerned the EU. We begin by locating British MPs on a 'devolution' scale that taps their resistance to the decentralisation of power from Westminster (instead of their general left-right preferences).⁴⁴ MPs' 'devolution' scores (my proxy for preferences) are then graphed against their voting behaviour in 71 EU-related divisions (see Figure 4).⁴⁵ Conservative MPs are generally more resistant to decentralising power from Westminster than are Labour MPs, but there is quite a bit of overlap between the two parties. The general pattern, visible among Labour MPs, but certainly much stronger among Conservatives, is for dissenting votes to increase as an MP becomes more resistant to decentralising power from Westminster.

If Conservative MPs are dissenting because of the temptation of Labour's position on the EU, then moderate, not extreme, Conservatives should be casting the dissenting votes. Clearly, this does not occur. It may be the case, however, that the *status quo* policy toward the EU under Thatcher was to the right of the Major government's position. If so, then one may simply be seeing Eurosceptics – who are predominantly Conservatives – resisting Major's efforts to take a more moderate stance toward the EU. This would still count as preference-driven behaviour. Of course, it does not explain why so many Labour MPs to the left of the Conservative Cabinet's median cast dissenting votes. If the (Conservative) Cabinet is moving the *status quo* from the right to its median (causing Eurosceptic extremists to dissent), then every MP to the left of the Cabinet's median should support this. Indeed, the parliamentary voting records show that very frequently the Labour frontbench did *not* oppose the Conservative government on Maastricht Treaty divisions.⁴⁶ That, however, implies that a fair number of Labour backbenchers are (or at least seem to be) voting against policy moves that make them better off!

One possible explanation for this curious result is that the Maastricht Treaty, the largest (and most contentious) piece of EU legislation considered by this Parliament, tapped into two dimensions, one concerning the devolution of power from Westminster, the other concerning left-right issues. The Treaty moved Britain closer to Europe, it is true, but John Major had secured an opt-out of the accompanying Social Chapter because he did not want to move British labour market and social policy to the political left. Perhaps Figure 4 simply reflects the fact that the voting behaviour of *three* distinct groups was governed by their preferences on *two* ideological dimensions, to wit:

1. Eurosceptics (mostly Conservatives) voting against the Treaty and their party because of their preferences on the devolution of power from Westminster.

2. Labour frontbenchers frequently abstaining because even if they did not get the Social Chapter, they did not wish to oppose legislation that secured a closer relationship with the EU.
3. Labour leftists acting against their leaders' instructions and opposing ratification because of the omission of the Social Chapter.

Indeed, Poole and Rosenthal explicitly connect this sort of 'ends-against-the-middle' voting pattern with the presence of a two-dimensional issue.⁴⁷ I test this possibility by regressing the number of dissenting votes that an MP cast on EU matters on his or her ideological preferences on devolution *and* left-right issues. A party dummy and interactions allow the coefficients to vary by party. The results (Table 1) indicate that preferences on devolution of power are related to dissenting votes on EU matters, powerfully so for Conservative MPs. Left-right preferences, however, have no statistically significant effect on EU-related dissent.⁴⁸ In the end, then, one cannot argue that these unexpected voting patterns – especially of Labour dissidents – are the result of two-dimensional preferences.

Individual-level Analysis: Cross-voting on Bill C-41 in the Canadian House of Commons

One of the difficulties of working with aggregate voting data is that in any large group of divisions it is not clear precisely where the *status quo* points and the alternatives are located. As a consequence, it is entirely possible (and probably very likely) that dissent is a function of both extremists

TABLE 1
REGRESSION OF DISSENTING VOTES CAST BY BRITISH MPS ON EU ISSUES
CONSIDERED BY THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, 1992–97

Dependent = Number of Dissenting Votes Cast by MP on EU Matters During 1992–97 Parliament	B	SE B	95% Confidence Interval*	
			Lower	Upper
Devolution (Low = pro-devolution)	5.61	1.32	2.73	8.49
Left-Right (Low = Left)	-.31	1.00	-2.69	2.06
Labour MP	15.07	5.75	2.89	27.25
Labour MP x Devolution	-4.79	1.25	-7.27	-2.31
Labour MP x Left-Right	-.78	1.14	-3.23	1.67
Constant	-10.72	4.76	-20.68	-0.76
Adjusted R ²	.08			
N	618			

Note: * Multiple imputation estimates follow a t-distribution with the degrees of freedom based on the proportion of missing data. The displayed confidence intervals reflect these facts.

resisting their party's moves to the political centre and moderates resisting the party's moves – in different divisions – to the political extremes. If this is the case, then the aggregate-level relationship between dissent and ideological preferences may appear random. The remedy is to delve beneath the aggregate data and look at how more focussed ideological scales predict dissent in a few specific divisions. The challenge is to find divisions (with dissent) on matters that one can reasonably argue are closely connected to one of the more focussed ideological scales (either the British devolution scale or the Canadian social morality scale) *and* which consider clear-cut alternatives so that it is possible to assess confidently whether the House is considering a move from the extremes to the centre or the reverse. The set of divisions that meet these criteria is very small. Three divisions in the Canadian Parliament on bill C-41 have been chosen.

In June 1995 the Liberal government brought bill C-41 before the House. The bill contained general amendments to the criminal code including a controversial clause (clause 718) that sought to extend the definition of hate crimes to include crimes committed against homosexuals.⁴⁹ Despite the moral overtones of this measure, the Prime Minister and the Justice Minister refused to allow a free-vote on C-41 and in response Liberal backbenchers tabled several hostile amendments of the controversial clause at the report stage. Clause 718 contained two sub-clauses. The first mandated stiffer sentences for crimes 'motivated by bias, prejudice, or hatred based on race, nationality, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, or sexual orientation of the victim'.⁵⁰ The second provided for harsher sentencing of those convicted of committing a crime while in a position of trust *vis-à-vis* the victim. Three proposed amendments are of concern here. The first (Motion 6) was the most extreme relative to the government's initial wording; it sought to delete entirely the sub-clause that defined groups against which hate crimes might be committed.⁵¹ The second (Motion 7) was less extreme in that it sought to delete the list of victims' characteristics and the word 'hatred' from the first sub-clause. The third motion (Motion 8) was identical to the second, save that it proposed only to delete the list of characteristics, leaving the word 'hatred' in the bill.⁵² Thus Motion 8 was the least extreme of the three motions and the one closest to the Cabinet's wording. The divisions on these motions were taken one after the other.⁵³

The divisions on these three amendments are excellent data on which to test the 'party versus preference' hypothesis. Firstly, the Cabinet and a number of Liberal backbenchers expressed strong preferences over the content of the bill, so in a situation in which both party pressure and backbench preferences are strong, we get to see which is the more powerful force. Secondly, MPs' preferences over social morality are far more likely to

have governed their votes in these divisions than their left-right preferences. A right-wing MP, for example, might be a libertarian who regards homosexuality as an individual's private affair, or he may be a religious conservative who balks at recognising homosexuality in legislation. Presumably, however, the more morally conservative the MP, the more likely s/he was to have voted for the three amendments (that is against the Cabinet's position). Similarly, MPs with a liberal view of social morality should have voted against the amendments. In short, it is reasonable to assume that the social morality scale is a valid measure of MPs' preferences on C-41 and its associated amendments. Thirdly, when a median agenda is employed alongside an elimination amendment procedure (the procedure used in the Canadian Parliament), legislators with single-peaked preferences have little incentive to vote strategically.⁵⁴ A median agenda is one in which more extreme proposals are voted on before less extreme proposals. Given that the *status quo* in this instance is the Government's original wording, and that relative to this wording, the amendments are ordered from most to least extreme (that is, there is a median agenda), voting on these three amendments should be sincere.⁵⁵ One can be fairly confident then that the preferences that governed MPs' votes in these three divisions are identical to the (presumably sincere) preferences that they expressed over social morality in the 1993 Canadian Candidate Survey.⁵⁶

Now under a preference-driven theory of parliamentary behaviour, parties are merely agglomerations of like-minded individuals, not organisations capable of altering preferences. It follows that party affiliation should be unrelated to voting behaviour in these divisions *after one controls for MPs' preferences over social morality*. Thus, if MPs' votes on these three motions are regressed on their preferences on social morality and their party labels, the coefficient of the preference variable should be statistically significant while those attached to the party dummy variables should be insignificant.⁵⁷ This hypothesis is tested with three ordered logit models of vote choice, one for each amendment. The key independent variable is an MP's score on the social morality scale. This scale ranged from zero to seven with high scores indicating moral conservatism. (See the Appendix for lists of the survey items used to construct the social morality scale.) The Reform Party voted for the amendments while the Bloc and Liberal parties voted against the amendments, party dummies are included for the latter two parties.⁵⁸ Logit models are sensitive to mis-specification and so also included in the model are the percentage of Catholics, immigrants and non-religious people in an MP's constituency and the MP's age; all these variables can be expected to influence MPs' views on homosexuality and hate crimes.⁵⁹

There is some question about what to do with MPs who did not vote in some or all of the divisions on these three amendments. As mentioned

above, the standing orders in these parliaments do not allow MPs to abstain formally; if an MP wishes to abstain s/he has to miss the vote intentionally. In the abstract, abstention, like any other form of legislative behaviour, is motivated by preferences, the difference here being that the preferences of abstaining MPs over social morality are not strong enough to induce them to vote for or against these three amendments, but instead leave them indifferent. An MP's absence is therefore a potentially useful bit of information. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to distinguish abstention disguised as absence, from absence caused by prior commitments, travel, illness and the like. Three pieces of information afford reasonable assumptions in this area, however:

1. The 20 divisions at the report stage of C-41, including the three considered here, were held in a single afternoon.⁶⁰ A division on Third reading was held the next day.⁶¹
2. The Government signalled its intention to pass C-41 before the summer break by passing a time allocation motion a week before the report stage.⁶² The House also set the time and order of voting the day before the report stage divisions were actually taken.⁶³ The bill's journey through the House also garnered considerable media attention.⁶⁴
3. Four MPs who were interviewed described intentional absenteeism as a popular means of avoiding votes on unpopular issues, with one talking about C-41 specifically, saying that many MPs left their seats and retired to the members' lounges as controversial amendments were called.⁶⁵ One MP publicly stated that he intended to skip the Third reading vote as a sign of his disapproval for the bill.⁶⁶

These facts suggest that the MPs who were absent from these three divisions knew when and what they were supposed to vote on and by all accounts intended to be absent. It seems reasonable, therefore, to count as abstaining, MPs who missed these three divisions but who voted in at least one of the 20 report stage divisions or in the Third reading division taken the next day. These MPs were in or about the House when the divisions occurred but did not vote on the three divisions examined here. Thus we code 'No' votes as 0, absences as 0.5 and 'Yes' votes as 1.⁶⁷ The results are shown in Table 2.⁶⁸

MPs' social morality – their preferences on this issue – has a statistically significant impact on how they voted. All else equal, the more morally conservative an MP the more likely he or she is to vote for these amendments (that is, against the Liberal Cabinet's original bill). That being said, party affiliation also affects MPs' voting choices. If party is little more than a voluntary agglomeration of like-minded individuals, then controlling

TABLE 2
ORDERED LOGIT ESTIMATES OF VOTING ON MOTIONS 6, 7, AND 8 TO C-41 (HATE CRIMES) IN THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT

Dependent: No = 0; Absent = 0.5; Yes = 1	Motion 6 (Deletes entire sub-clause)				Motion 7 (Deletes list of groups and 'hatred')				Motion 8 (Deletes list of groups)			
	SE B		95% Confidence Interval*		SE B		95% Confidence Interval*		SE B		95% Confidence Interval*	
	B		Lower	Upper	B		Lower	Upper	B		Lower	Upper
Moral Conservatism	0.64	0.18	0.29	0.99	0.74	0.18	0.39	1.09	0.65	0.18	0.30	1.00
Liberal MP	-5.63	1.02	-7.63	-3.63	-5.55	1.03	-7.57	-3.53	-4.36	0.85	-6.03	-2.69
Bloc MP	-7.75	1.67	-11.01	-4.48	-6.56	1.43	-9.36	-3.76	-5.09	1.20	-7.44	-2.74
% Immigrants	-0.05	0.03	-0.11	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.07	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.05	0.03
% Catholic	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.05	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.02
% No Religion	0.10	0.05	-0.01	0.20	0.06	0.05	-0.04	0.16	0.03	0.04	-0.05	0.11
MPs' Age	-0.08	0.03	-0.14	-0.01	-0.10	0.03	-0.16	-0.04	-0.05	0.03	-0.11	0.01
Cutpoint 1	-4.34	2.34	-8.93	0.25	-5.54	2.24	-9.93	-1.15	-3.03	1.87	-6.70	0.64
Cutpoint 2	-2.86	2.30	-7.37	1.65	-4.36	2.21	-8.69	-0.03	-2.04	1.87	-5.71	1.63
Pseudo R ²		.59				.53				.43		
N		235				235				235		

Note: * Multiple imputation estimates follow a t-distribution with the degrees of freedom based on the proportion of missing data. The displayed confidence intervals reflect these facts.

TABLE 3
THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF PARTY AND PREFERENCES ON MPS' VOTES ON MOTION 7 AT REPORT STAGE OF BILL C-41
(HATE CRIMES) IN THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT

Social Morality Score*	Pr (No Vote) in %		Pr (Absent) in %		Pr (Yes Vote) in %	
	Liberal MP	Reform MP	Liberal MP	Reform MP	Liberal MP	Reform MP
2.0 Lib. 10th%	96.3	9.3	2.5	15.7	1.2	75.0
3.1 Lib. 50th%	92.1	4.3	5.3	8.5	2.6	87.2
3.3 Ref. 10th%	91.0	3.8	6.1	7.5	3.0	88.7
4.5 Ref. 50th%	80.4	1.6	12.6	3.4	7.0	95.1
4.7 Lib. 90th%	78.0	1.4	14.0	2.9	8.0	95.7
5.5 Ref. 90th%	66.1	0.7	20.3	1.7	13.6	97.6

Notes: *Higher scores indicate greater social conservatism.

Liberal Party (i.e., Cabinet) Position = No; Reform Party Position = Yes.

Constituency variables (% immigrants, % Catholics, % non-religious) and MP age set at means.

for MPs' preferences over social morality should rob the party variables of any explanatory power. That does not happen: Bloc and Liberal MPs were far more likely to vote against these amendments all else (including preferences) being equal. The marginal effects of party and preferences are not obvious in these sorts of non-linear models. Table 3 shows the probability of a Liberal and Reform MP voting for or against or abstaining on Motion 7 given varying levels of moral conservatism. Values of the other variables in the model are held at their means, so what one sees are the marginal effects of party and preferences on the vote choice of an MP who represents an average riding. The levels of moral conservatism correspond to the values of the tenth, fiftieth and ninetieth percentiles in the Liberal and Reform Parties. Table 3 sets in sharp relief how much more powerful party is relative to preferences. The probability that even the most morally conservative Liberal MP will actively or passively resist his party's position (by cross-voting or abstaining) is just 22 per cent (Absent = 14 per cent + 'Yes' = eight per cent); s/he is over three times as likely to vote the party line (78 per cent). Change that same MP's party affiliation from Liberal to Reform, however, and s/he is almost certain (95.7 per cent) to vote against the (Liberal) Cabinet. (In the event 26 of 152 Liberal MPs abstained or cross-voted.) Party, it would seem, not only matters, but matters a great deal relative to preferences.

The Voting Behaviour of Deserters

In all of the above tests MPs' preferences are estimated from their survey responses. In light of this, one might well argue that the preferences tapped by the surveys and those that guide MPs' voting decisions are two entirely different things. An MP could, for example, privately believe that abortion should be legal and say so on the survey. Nevertheless, given years of correspondence with his/her constituents the MP may be acutely aware of the fact that a large majority of his constituents oppose legalised abortions and hence s/he may vote against it in the division lobbies. In other words, the surveys may tap MPs' sincere policy preferences while their votes are guided by their electorally induced preferences. Under these circumstances, it would not be surprising to find little connection between MPs' preferences and their voting behaviour; one has simply measured the wrong preferences.⁶⁹ One way to respond to this argument is to examine the voting behaviour of MPs who left their parties either to join another party or to sit as independents. The test is simple: MPs' voting behaviour prior to their departure is compared to their voting behaviour after their departure. If party is simply a label rather than an organisation capable of altering preferences, then pre- and post-departure voting records should be very similar.⁷⁰ The advantage of this test relative to the others is that it does not

TABLE 4
VOTING PATTERNS OF PARTY DEFECTORS IN THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN PARLIAMENTS
BEFORE AND AFTER LEAVING THEIR PARTIES

MP (Party)	Before Defection		N	After Defection		N
	For	Versus Absent		For	Versus Absent	
Canada						
Nunziata (Liberal) ⁴	50.7	18.8	144	13.4	7.9	164
Brown (Reform) ¹	61.3	1.3	150	2.2	0.0	137
Leblanc (Bloc) ¹	42.7	1.1	260	8.7	2.2	46
Mills (Liberal) ²	43.9	3.4	262	0.0	2.2	46
Mean	49.7	6.2	44.2	6.1	3.1	90.9
Britain						
Body (Cons.) ²	59.5	0.0	37	27.8	0.0	18
Howarth (Cons.) ³	82.4	2.9	34	0.0	71.4	21
Nicholson (Cons.) ³	82.4	0.0	34	0.0	61.9	21
Thornham (Cons.) ³	100.0	0.0	36	15.8	57.9	19
Mean	81.1	0.7	18.2	10.9	47.8	41.3
Overall Mean	65.4	3.1	31.2	8.5	15.1	66.1

Notes: 1 = Left to sit as an independent
 2 = Resigned whip temporarily
 3 = Defected to another party
 4 = Expelled

rest on any survey data whatsoever. Thus, worries about the discrepancies between MPs' sincere and induced preferences, the temporal distance from the application of the candidate surveys to the act of voting in the division lobbies, the inherent measurement error of survey instruments and any doubts about the multiple imputation of missing survey responses are all addressed by this simple test. Table 4 shows the percentage of votes that the eight party-leavers in this sample cast for (that is, with) and against their original parties before and after their departure. The table also shows the percentage of divisions missed by the MP and the number of votes on which these percentages are based.

The results are striking. In every single case there is a marked change in voting behaviour. The within country and overall means indicate that party-leavers are far less likely to vote for their original parties (65.4 per cent to 8.5 per cent on the overall mean) and were far more likely to miss divisions altogether (31.2 per cent to 66.1 per cent on the overall mean) after their departures.⁷¹ It is hard to square these results with a model in which preferences are unaffected by party.⁷²

CONCLUSION

Krehbiel's simple preference-driven model of legislative behaviour is designed to drive home two points: 1) parties are not necessary for cohesion; and 2) party-based models of legislative behaviour do not produce unique observable implications *vis-à-vis* a naive spatial model driven solely by the preferences of individual parliamentarians. From this perspective parties are not essential elements of legislative theories. The implications for empirical research are clear: pay attention to legislators' preferences and legislative rules – the things tell us which legislator is the median voter, veto point and so on – but, do not worry too much about political parties. The evidence presented here suggests that this null model (as far as parties are concerned) can safely be rejected. MPs' ideological preferences affect their behaviour, of course, but one cannot go beyond this and declare that parties do not matter once individual preferences have been taken into account, or – stated more bluntly – that parties are no more than shared preferences. An extreme statement of this sort is demonstrably untrue: even after one controls for MPs' ideological preferences, an MP's party membership tells us a good deal about how that MP is likely to behave (see Tables 2, 3 and 4). This is, in fact, an understatement. An MP's party affiliation provides vastly more information about his or her behaviour than do his or her preferences (see especially Table 3 and 4). Preferences are, nevertheless, still part of the overall picture and in this light the position that MPs' behaviour is driven by preferences that are constrained by both party

and legislative rules appears quite reasonable. Again, the implications for empirical research are clear: in addition to legislative and electoral rules, pay careful attention to the ways in which parties condition and constrain their members' preferences.

NOTES

1. See, for example, D. Searing, *World: Understanding Political Roles* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); L. Longley and R. Hazan (eds.), *The Uneasy Relationships Between Parliamentary Members and Leaders* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000); S. Bowler, D. Farrell and R. Katz, *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1999).
2. For example, J. Aldrich, *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995); G. Cox, *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Parties in Victorian England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); A. Ranney, *Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1965); M. Laver and K. Schepsle, 'Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics', *British Journal of Political Science*, 20 (1990), pp.489–507; G. Leubbert, *Comparative Democracy: Policy Making and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
3. K. Krehbiel, 'Where's the Party?', *British Journal of Political Science*, 23/2 (1993), pp.235–66; K. Krehbiel, 'Paradoxes of Parties in Congress', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 14/1 (1999), pp.31–64.
4. Krehbiel's work has engendered a confusing nomenclature for legislators' preferences. For example, authors sometimes talk of 'party induced preferences' versus 'pre-party preferences', the latter meaning preferences that, while not necessarily sincere, are not induced by a legislator's party. I use 'preferences' to mean preferences that are exogenous to the influence of a party. Where they are not, I say so explicitly.
5. See, for example, J. Snyder and T. Groseclose, 'Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting', *American Journal of Political Science*, 44/2 (2000), pp.193–211; S. Smith, 'Positive Theories of Congressional Parties', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25/2 (2000), pp.193–215; G. Hager and J. Talbert, 'Looking for the Party Label: Party Influences on Voting in the U.S. House', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25/1 (2000), pp.75–99.
6. Beer, for example, worried that the invariantly high levels of party cohesion in the British Parliament would lead scholars to take it for granted: 'We are so familiar with this fact [the "Prussian discipline" of British parliamentary parties] that we are in danger of losing our sense of wonder over them [sic]'. See S. Beer, *Modern British Politics* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), pp.350–51. Mezey notes that this disunited American party-cohesive parliamentary party dichotomy still dominates the discipline. See M. Mezey, 'Legislatures: Individual Purpose and Institutional Performance', in A. Finifter (ed.), *The State of the Discipline II* (Washington, DC: APSA, 1993), p.346.
7. More precisely, parliamentary parties experience more dissent than one might think. See P. Norton, *Dissension in the House of Commons: Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons' Division Lobbies, 1945–1974* (London: Macmillan, 1975); P. Norton, *Dissension in the House of Commons, 1974–1979* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); J. Schwarz, 'Exploring a New Role in Policy Making: The British House of Commons in the 1970s', *American Political Science Review*, 74/1 (1980), pp.23–37; P. Cowley and P. Norton, 'Are Conservative MPs Revolting?', Research Paper in Legislative

- Studies 2/96, Centre for Legislative Studies, University of Hull, Hull, UK, 1996; P. Cowley and P. Norton with M. Stuart and M. Bailey, 'Blair's Bastards: Discontent Within the Parliamentary Labour Party', Research Paper in Legislative Studies 1/96, Centre for Legislative Studies, University of Hull, Hull, UK, 1996; J. Wearing, 'Party Discipline and the Westminster Model', Panel Report from the Canadian Political Science Association Conference, Brock University, St. Catherine's, Ontario, 2-4 June 1996; J. Wearing, 'Guns, Gays, and Gadflies: Party Dissent in the House of Commons Under Mulroney and Chrétien', Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Ottawa, 31 May-2 June 1998.
8. G. Loewenberg, S. Smith and K. Hamm, 'Editors' Introduction', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25/2 (2000), pp.165-8.
 9. G. Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 64/4 (1970), pp.1033-53; G. Sartori, 'Comparing and Miscomparing', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 3/3 (1991), pp.243-57.
 10. T. Saalfeld, 'On Dogs Whips and Recorded Votes', in the International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation (ed.), *Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium* (New York: Facts on File, 1986).
 11. P. Silk with R. Walters, *How Parliament Works* (London and New York: Longman, 1987).
 12. A. Lijphart, 'The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research', *Comparative Political Studies*, 8/2 (1975), pp.58-77.
 13. The label, 'majoritarian' parliamentary government (coined by A. Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries* [New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1984]) is to be preferred to Westminster parliamentary government, because it more accurately conveys the idea that power in these systems is typically monopolised by a simple parliamentary majority and because it avoids the perception that these political arrangements are narrowly and identically British.
 14. Though as Laver points out, timely (but not frequent) losses of cohesion may work to the advantage of party leaders engaged in negotiations with their coalition partners. See M. Laver, 'Divided Parties, Divided Government', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 24/1 (1999), pp.5-30.
 15. In other respects, these two parliaments were not exceptional. Both countries, for example, had experienced parliaments with higher and lower levels of backbench dissent.
 16. Specifically, MP_i votes for x if and only if $|x - mp_i| < |y - mp_i|$ and votes for y if and only if $|x - mp_i| > |y - mp_i|$ where mp_i is MP_i's ideal point. Thus, MPs have Euclidean preferences: $u_{MP_i}(x) > u_{MP_i}(y)$ iff $|x - mp_i| < |y - mp_i|$, $mp_i \in N$ and $x, y \in N$. Note that Figure 1 shows only two of many possible configurations of preferences and proposals. One can imagine, for example, a proposal, z , that lies far to the right of both x and y . In such a case, MPs of both parties would unanimously vote for y over z because y is closer to every MP's ideal point than z . Of course, it is exactly because all parliamentarians have an incentive to vote against these sorts of outlying proposals in favour of some more centrally located proposal, that one can reasonably assume that outlying proposals are very rare relative to proposals at or between the parties' positions, proposals which are far more contentious. In any case, it is the assumption that MPs vote for the proposal closest to their ideal point, not a particular configuration of preferences and proposals, that defines Krehbiel's preference-driven model of legislative behaviour.
 17. Krehbiel, 'Where's the Party?', pp.260-61. In fact, Krehbiel argues that the surge of backbench dissent witnessed at Westminster in the 1970s was due to a change in the distribution of preferences in the two main parties: an influx of new members increased the ideological heterogeneity within the parties while at the same time dampening the differences between them. In other words, the distribution of preferences in the two main British parties came over time to look less like Figure 1a and more like Figure 1b.

18. Krehbiel, 'Paradoxes of Parties in Congress', p.158. While this assumption may be wrong, Krehbiel's model does not depend on correctly identifying the origin of MPs' preferences. Nevertheless, Krehbiel's claim is essentially that preferences are (in theory) the only independent variable required to explain MPs' behaviour.
19. E. Ozbudun, 'Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis', *SAGE Professional Papers in Comparative Politics* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Books, 1970).
20. Norton's *Dissension in the House of Commons: Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons' Division Lobbies, 1945-1974* and *Dissension in the House of Commons, 1974-1979*, for example, employed an aggregate measure of dissent, the percentage of Commons' divisions that witnessed dissenting votes, as its dependent variable.
21. The Major, Heath and Callaghan governments suffered several important legislative defeats because of backbench revolts (see Norton, *Dissension in the House of Commons, 1974-1979*; Cowley and Norton, 'Are Conservative MPs Revolting?'). Simpson's account of the fall of the Clark government illustrates just how important MPs' absences, intentional and accidental, can be. See J. Simpson, *The Discipline of Power: The Conservative Interlude and the Liberal Restoration* (Toronto: Personal Library, 1980), pp.3-36.
22. J. Major, *John Major: The Autobiography* (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), p.610.
23. D. Denver, 'The Government that Could Do No Right', in Anthony King (ed.), *New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1998), pp.15-48; I. McAllister and D. Donley Studlar, 'Conservative Euroscepticism and the Referendum Party in the 1997 British General Election', *Party Politics*, 6/3 (2000), pp.359-71; P. Norton, 'The Conservative Party: "In Office But not in Power"', in Anthony King (ed.), *New Labour Triumphs*, pp.75-112.
24. D. Docherty, *Mr. Smith Goes to Ottawa: Life in the House of Commons* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), pp.169-70.
25. Dissenting votes on Private Members' Bills are excluded because the parties tend not to whip such divisions. Data on dissenting votes in the 1992-97 British House of Commons were obtained from P. Cowley and P. Norton's data-set, *Dissension in the House of Commons, 1974-1979*. Joseph Wearing provided similar data for the 1993-97 Canadian Parliament (though I had to remove Private Members' Bills).
26. For example, Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE. K. Poole and H. Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
27. J. Jackson and J. Kingdon, 'Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes', *American Journal of Political Science*, 36/3 (1992), pp.805-23.
28. Jackson and Kingdon, 'Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes'; J. Londregan, 'Estimating Legislators' Ideal Points', *Political Analysis*, 8/1 (2000), pp.38-56; W. Hixon and A. Wicks, 'Measuring Congressional Support for the President: Evaluating the NOMINATE Scores', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 30/1 (2000), pp.186-93; P. Vandoren, 'Can We Learn the Causes Of Congressional Decisions From Roll-Call Data', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 15/3 (1990), pp.311-39.
29. One potential solution to the lack of variance in MPs' voting records is to estimate preferences from free votes. By definition, free votes are free of party leaders' dictates, so one tends to observe more MPs cross-voting in these situations. This might enable one to estimate MPs' preferences from their free voting records and then use those estimates to assess the degree to which MPs' voting behaviour in whipped divisions is consistent with a preference-driven model of parliamentary behaviour. There are three flaws in this method:
 - Leaders, even if they declare a vote to be free, are not shy about making public their preferred position or otherwise trying to influence MPs' voting intentions (see, for example, Major, *John Major: The Autobiography*, p.213). In this case, free votes are not completely free of party influences.
 - Party leaders intent on preserving a façade of unity might submit to a division only those

matters which they are sure will not split their parties (as in Figure 1a). (See H. Berkeley, *Crossing the Floor* [London: Allen and Unwin, 1972], p.125.) In this instance, free votes would suffer from a form of selection bias.

- Free votes typically involve moral issues (for example, abortion and capital punishment). It is not clear how well MPs' preference on these matters help one predict their preferences on broader economic and social issues.
30. I employed the following candidate surveys: *Canadian Candidate Study, 1993*, Principal Investigator: L. Erickson; *British Candidate Study, 1992*, Principal Investigators: P. Norris and J. Lovenduski (ESRC Study No. 3287). These surveys polled the attitudes of all major party candidates in the elections just prior to the parliaments that I examine here. MPs are obviously a strict subset of parliamentary candidates. The response rates for these surveys were 53.1 per cent for the Canadian survey and 69 per cent for the British survey. See L. Erickson, 'Might More Women Make a Difference? Gender Party and Ideology Among Parliamentary Candidates', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 30/4 (1997), p.666; and P. Norris and J. Lovenduski, *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
 31. A disadvantage of survey-based estimates of MPs' preferences is that they are coarse relative to the complete preference orderings that NOMINATE can produce. Left-right self-placement scales, for example, provide an obvious measure of MPs' ideological preferences, but force MPs to cluster on only seven or ten points (as the case may be), thereby obscuring connections between ideology and behaviour. This problem is not entirely avoidable, but was ameliorated by constructing more finely grained scales from the survey items.
 32. My approach is very similar to the 'vanilla' approach used by Gabel and Huber, that is factor analyse all issue items (the source here being candidate surveys not party manifestos) via principal components and take the factor that explains the most variance in the data as the left-right dimension. The difference between my method and Gabel and Huber's is that I do not constrain the factor analysis to return just one factor. See M. Gabel and J. Huber, 'Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data', *American Journal of Political Science*, 44/1 (2000), pp.94-103.
 33. Under this re-scaling rule a five-point item (strongly agree, agree, ... strongly disagree) would be coded 0, .25, .5, .75, 1 from left to right; a three-point item would be coded 0, .5, 1. Additive scales were used in place of factor scores because non-responding MPs were (by definition) omitted from the factor analyses and I did not think it reasonable to assume that the factor scores would be exactly the same had non-responding MPs' (unobserved) answers been part of the analysis. I make the weaker assumption that the rotated factor solutions would still show the same variables loading on the same factors, albeit with different (and unobservable) weights, had non-responding MPs' answers been included in the factor analyses.

The British left-right scale was based on nine items and had 37 intervals. The Canadian left-right scale was also based on nine survey items but it had only 23 intervals. The British devolution scale was created from five items and had 15 intervals. The Canadian moral conservatism scale was built from seven items and had 27 intervals. MPs were assigned scores on these scales based on their responses to the relevant questions.

A chief advantage of this construction is that it is possible to say in a concrete fashion that MP answered 'agree' or 'strongly agree' to more rightist policy items than MPj. Moreover, if one also considers the high degree of ideological constraint exhibited by MPs and their shared political culture, comparisons across individuals on these scales (but not countries) would seem to be meaningful. A high degree of ideological constraint, after all, implies that MPs are not answering questions randomly, and a shared political culture, that they are placing similar weights on similar policy items. Thus, there is a sound basis for

taking the difference in the number of rightist responses given by any two MPs as indicative of the true ideological distance between these individuals.

34. I used *NORM 2.2 for Windows* to generate six British data-sets and ten Canadian data-sets. *NORM 2.2 for Windows* is written by Joseph Schafer and is available on-line at www.stat.psu.edu/~jsl/. For information on multiple imputation, see D. Rubin, 'Multiple Imputation After 18+ Years', *Journal of The American Statistical Association*, 91/434 (1996), pp.473–89; D. Rubin, *Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1986); D. Rubin, 'Formalizing Subjective Notions About the Effect of Nonrespondents in Sample Surveys', *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 72/359 (1977), pp.538–43; R. Little and D. Rubin, 'The Analysis of Social Science Data with Missing Values', *Sociological Methods and Research*, 18/2 & 3 (1989), pp.292–326; J. Schafer, *Analysis of Incomplete Multivariate Data* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1997).

The percentages of data missing in the data-sets were 11.0 per cent for Britain and 8.2 per cent for Canada. The percentage of missing data should not be confused with the response rates of the surveys (on which see note 30 above) or the rate of missing information in any particular variable (on which see Rubin, *Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys*). To conceive of the percentage of missing data the reader should imagine the data-set as a matrix of n cases by k variables. For every one of the nk cells in the matrix a datum is observed (that is, the cell contains some realisation of the k th variable for the n th case) or missing, in which case the cell is empty. The percentage of missing data is just the percentage of the nk cells that are empty. There are two reasons why the percentage of missing data is far lower than the non-response rates of the candidate surveys might lead one to expect. First, some variables such as the MP's age, educational background, party affiliation, parliamentary rank, date of first election and the like were available from public sources such as the *Canadian Parliamentary Guide* or *Dod's Parliamentary Companion*. In these cases, a missing cell could be filled with the observed datum. The second reason is technical, but put very simply, the more observed data one has on hand, the better one does at estimating values for the missing data. This does not occur because of a larger sample size (though that helps), but because the addition of fully observed background variables makes it more likely that one has accounted for unobserved differences in the survey responses of respondents and non-respondents (Rubin, 'Formalizing Subjective Notions About the Effect of Nonrespondents in Sample Surveys', p.540). The aim then is to include in the matrix vectors of observed data that are thought to be related to the missing data (see Rubin, *Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys* and 'Multiple Imputation After 18+ Years', pp.478–9). As the number of fully observed vectors are added to the matrix, the percentage of cells with missing data necessarily shrinks. I used three sources of information to help impute survey responses for non-responding MPs:

- Survey responses from all other major party candidates (as per X. Meng, 'Multiple Imputation Inferences With Uncongenial Sources of Input', *Statistical Science*, 9/4 [1994], p.541, with a dummy variable to identify winners [that is, MPs] and losers). With the addition of these cases non-responding MPs comprise 19.8 per cent of available British observations and 21.5 per cent of available Canadian observations.
- Socio-economic profiles of every constituency garnered from recent census data.
- The electoral histories (that is, party vote shares) of every constituency over the past three elections in each country.

Once these data are included in the data matrix, the percentage of missing data due to non-responding MPs is quite small.

35. This operational decision has little if any impact on the article's results because there is not

much difference between the ideological medians of the parties' front and backbenches.

36. It should be noted that Norton (*Dissension in the House of Commons: Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons' Division Lobbies, 1945–1974* and *Dissension in the House of Commons, 1974–1979*) still counts votes cast in this fashion as instances of dissent. This is quite sensible: even though these votes are not cast against party policy, they are cast against the instructions of the party whip and the latter, not the former, is the standard by which a dissenting vote is defined.
37. Wearing (personal communication, 1999) lists dissent on 160 of 735 total divisions (21.8 per cent). However, 32 of the 160 divisions with dissent were on Private Members' Bills where it is not clear if the whips were on. An additional eight divisions saw dissent only by members of the minor New Democratic Party. Data on dissent in the British Commons do not include the Liberal Democrats or the nationalist parties (for example, Norton, *Dissension in the House of Commons, 1974–1979*). Excluding the dissenting divisions on Private Members' Bills and divisions that saw only New Democrats dissent leaves major party dissent on 120 of 735 (16.3 per cent) divisions.
38. Norton (*Dissension in the House of Commons: Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons' Division Lobbies, 1945–1974*, p.xi) defines a cross-vote as a vote cast by an MP against his or her party in a division in which the two main parties oppose one another (as opposed, in particular, to a division in which the Opposition front bench abstains). This definition is not well-suited to the Canadian case where there are two main opposition parties, so consider a cross-vote here as simply a vote cast by an MP against his or her party in a division in which his or her party participates. Almost all dissenting votes in the Canadian Commons are cross-votes because Canadian opposition parties almost never abstain from divisions.
39. Wearing, 'Guns, Gays, and Gadflies'.
40. Gabel and Huber, 'Putting Parties in Their Place'; J. Huber and R. Inglehart, 'Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies', *Party Politics*, 1/1 (1995), pp.73–111; M. Laver and B. Hunt, *Policy and Party Competition* (London: Routledge, 1992).
41. Rubin, *Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys*, pp.114–15.
42. Huber and Inglehart, 'Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies'; Gabel and Huber, 'Putting Parties in Their Place'.
43. Poole and Rosenthal, *Congress*, pp.252–8.
44. In this context, the term 'devolution' refers simply to the handing over of some measure of authority by one body to another and not to the recent constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales. 'Devolution scale' is simply more concise than 'decentralisation of national sovereignty scale'. The devolution scale and the British left-right scale are correlated at $r = .4$.
45. The sample of EU-related divisions included 64 divisions on the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, two on the Treaty of Maastricht (Social Protocol), two on the European Communities (Finance) Bill, one on European Communities, one on the European Union and one on Europe and a Referendum. See *Dissension in the House of Commons 1992 to 1997 Codebook* (ECSR Study No.4055).
46. It would be difficult to footnote each and every division where this occurred, but two prominent examples are the Second (*Parliamentary Debates [Hansard]* 21 May 1992, pp.597–600) and Third (*Parliamentary Debates [Hansard]* 20 May 1993, pp.469–71) readings of the Maastricht Treaty.
47. Poole and Rosenthal, *Congress*, p.228.
48. An F-test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the LEFT-RIGHT and the LEFT-RIGHT \times LABOUR MP coefficients were jointly insignificant.
49. *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada (Hansard)* (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 20 Sept. 1994), p.5871. Volumes used here are available on-line at www.parl.gc.ca/cgi-bin/hansard/e_hansard_master.pl.

50. *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, 22 Sept. 1994, p.6029.
51. *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, 13 June 1995, p.13769.
52. *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, 13 June 1995, p.13770.
53. *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, 14 June 1995, pp.13837–9.
54. B. Rasch, 'Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25/1 (2000), pp.16–17.
55. The bill, moreover, was not an omnibus bill of the sort encountered in the US Congress, full of sub-clauses designed to dole out particularistic benefits to MPs' constituencies. It is unlikely then that MPs' preferences over social morality were trumped by strategic considerations over the distribution of political pork. Nor is it possible to argue that the votes on these amendments were matters of confidence. The confidence convention in the Canadian Commons is not nearly so strong that a Government would be forced to resign upon losing divisions on amendments to a bill, even an important one. On this last point, see C. Franks, *The Parliament of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p.139.
56. There would seem to be little incentive for respondents to misrepresent their preferences in an anonymous survey. Of course, one might argue that the surveys are simply poor instruments for measuring preferences, sincere or not.
57. Hagar and Talbert, 'Looking for the Party Label', p.81.
58. I omit independent, Conservative and NDP MPs from the analysis. Independents and Conservatives are excluded because it is nonsensical to talk of dissent when a member belongs to no party or when only one party member votes. The small size of the NDP (five of nine NDP MPs voted in these amendments) severely limits their contribution to the analysis from a statistical and a substantive standpoint.
59. P. Kennedy, *A Guide to Econometrics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3rd Edn. 1992), p.236. The hypothesis is that younger MPs are more willing to accept alternative lifestyles. Variables such as the MP's sex and educational level did not have any impact on the models. The percentage of rural polls in a constituency, a good indicator of how urban and cosmopolitan the constituency is, also had no effect. This may be because the percentage of immigrants is already an excellent indicator of those characteristics. The general hypothesis is that a high level of immigrants and non-religious constituents are negatively correlated to votes for these amendments (both because these variables mark a constituency as cosmopolitan and also because immigrants were protected under the government's original wording). A large Catholic presence, on the other hand, should be positively correlated with support for the amendments given the Catholic Church's opposition to homosexuality. It is conceivable, however, that the percentage of immigrants is positively correlated to support for the latter two motions. These motions attempted to remove references to sexual orientation while leaving untouched references to crimes motivated by bias and prejudice. Morally traditional immigrant or ethnic communities might well want this protection without having to recognise sexual orientation as a legitimate object of hate crimes.
60. *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, 14 June 1995, pp.13760–95.
61. *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, 15 June 1995, pp.13978–9.
62. *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, 8 June 1995, pp.13448–9.
63. *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, 13 June 1995, pp.13760–95.
64. See, for example, 'Internal Party Fight Over Bill Sputters: Solidarity Reigns', *Globe and Mail* (24 Nov. 1994), p.A6; 'Liberals face rough ride in House Explosive issues top agenda as MPs return to Ottawa', *Toronto Star* (6 Feb. 1995), p.A9; 'Liberals expected to pass 3 thorny bills within a week: "The longer they let things drag on the more difficult it would be to control their backbenchers"', *Vancouver Sun* (13 June 1995), p.A7.
65. See also Franks, *The Parliament of Canada*, p.105.
66. 'Iftody to Rebel Again', *Winnipeg Free Press* (15 June 1995), p.A1.
67. Only 16 per cent of MPs missed all 21 divisions. A vast majority (76 per cent) of MPs voted

in 11 or more of the 21 divisions. Two hundred and thirty-five MPs are counted as participating in the divisions on Motion 6, 7, and 8, implying that 60 MPs were excluded from the analysis either because they missed all 21 divisions or because they were not members of one of the three major parties. The results of the divisions were as follows: Motion 6: 52 Yes, 16 Absent, 167 No; Motion 7: 58 Yes, 17 Absent, 160 No; Motion 8: 63 Yes, 20 Absent, 152 No.

68. My coding and sample selection rules are defensible. I used a logistic regression to discern statistical differences between MPs who missed all report stage motions but attended the Third reading division the following day. The dichotomous dependent variable was Third reading but not report stage attendance (1) versus some report stage attendance (0). The independent variables were exactly the same as those in the voting models shown in Table 3 plus a variable indicating the MPs parliamentary rank (whip, minister, shadow minister, and so on). These are variables that are hypothesised to lead MPs to resist the Government's bill, either by voting against it or (of greater concern here) by avoiding intentionally the divisions on C-41. The only variable that even approached statistical significance was rank, with those attending only the Third reading division being of higher rank. This is a sensible result given that ministers and party leaders typically miss many more votes than backbenchers. With the dependent variable changed to differentiate between those who attended at least one division (that is, my sample) and those who missed all 21 divisions (that is, those dropped from the analysis), the same model found virtually no differences between the two groups. (Only the percentage of non-religious constituents approached statistical significance.) Therefore selection bias does not seem to be a problem.

Finally, I altered the dependent variable so that it separated those who voted only in the Third reading division (but missed all report stage divisions) from those who missed all 21 divisions (and who were dropped from the analysis). The former were included in the analysis and counted as abstaining. Given the evidence from the interviews and media it is not hard to believe that MPs who had, in fact, voted during the report stage, that is, who were demonstrably in the House the afternoon these motions were voted on, absented themselves intentionally. It is more difficult to accept that MPs who showed up only the next day for the Third reading vote did the same thing. However, the selection model not only uncovered statistically significant differences between the two groups, but showed that these differences occurred on many of the same variables that were correlated with abstention or 'yes' votes in the voting models, that is, percentage of immigrants, Catholics, non-religious people and the MP's age. In other words, the variables that separate abstentions and 'Yes' votes from 'No' votes are exactly those that separate those who voted only in the Third reading division from those who missed all 21 divisions on C-41. This last result in particular would seem to justify my decision to count as abstaining those MPs who missed all 20 report stage divisions but who attended the Third reading division.

69. The argument and example were suggested by an anonymous referee.
70. Hagar and Talbert, 'Looking for the Party Label'; G. Cox, 'On the Effects of Legislative Rules', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 25/2 (2000), p.182. Whether the MP leaves or is expelled is moot. In either case, the null hypothesis is that a change in party affiliation does not lead to a change in voting behaviour.
71. The means are just the simple means across members; they are not weighted by the number of divisions. Within countries, the simple and weighted means are very similar.
72. One might argue that MPs' simply changed their preferences. This could happen, for example, if MPs' preferences are electorally induced and their electorate undergoes a significant change during the parliamentary term. This hypothesis can, in fact, be rejected. A substantial redistribution was conducted in Britain in 1995 and Butler and Kavanagh (*The British General Election of 1997* [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997], p.258) record an index of change measuring the inflow and outflow of voters relative to the size of a

constituency's electoral base. If changes to MPs' electorates motivate changes in their behaviour, then one would expect to see relatively large indices of change for the electorates of the four British party-leavers. This is not the case. The average index of change among Conservative constituencies was 25; among the defectors, only Body's constituency experienced greater than average change (62) – and his behaviour changed the least. I also compared the defectors to six loyal Conservatives whose constituencies experienced large changes. The pre- and post-redistribution voting patterns (in the same divisions) of these six MPs were almost identical: Pre-redistribution: 70.5 per cent For, 0.7 per cent Versus, 29.2 per cent Absent; Post-redistribution, 69.4 per cent For, 0.0 per cent Versus, 30.7 per cent Absent. In addition, the political impact of the redistribution was similar across both defectors' and loyalists' constituencies.

APPENDIX IDEOLOGICAL SCALES

Tables A1–A4 list the survey items that are used to create the ideological scales used in this paper. Items' response categories (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree) are also noted.

TABLE A1
SURVEY ITEMS USED TO CONSTRUCT BRITISH LEFT–RIGHT
IDEOLOGICAL SCALE

LEFT–RIGHT SCALE	Categories
1. Do you think the government should or should not encourage the growth of private medicine?	5
2. Do you think the government should or should not introduce stricter laws to regulate trade unions?	5
3. Do you think that trade unions in this country have far too much power, too much power, etc...?	5
4. And do you think that business and industry have far too much power, too much power, etc...?	5
5. There is one law for the rich and one for the poor (Agree/Disagree).	5
6. There is no need for strong unions to protect employees' working conditions and wages (Agree/Disagree).	5
7. Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems (Agree/Disagree).	5
8. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership (Agree/Disagree).	5
9. It is government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one (Agree/Disagree).	5

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TABLE A2
SURVEY ITEMS USED TO CONSTRUCT BRITISH DEVOLUTION
IDEOLOGICAL SCALE

DEVOLUTION SCALE	Categories
1. On the whole do you think the UK's interests are better served by closer links with Western Europe, America, or both equally?	3
2. How would you like to see the EC develop: a) a fully integrated Europe with most major decisions taken by a European government ... d) complete British withdrawal from the EC?	4
3. Which of these statements comes closest to your view: a) Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the EC ... d) There should be no change from the present system?	4
4. Which of these statements comes closest to your view: a) Wales should become independent, separate from the UK and the EC ... d) There should be no change from the present system?	4

TABLE A3
SURVEY ITEMS USED TO CONSTRUCT CANADIAN LEFT-RIGHT
IDEOLOGICAL SCALE

LEFT-RIGHT SCALE	Categories
1. Do you think government should see to it that everyone has a job or leave people to get ahead on their own?	2
2. Capital punishment is never justified no matter what the crime (Agree/Disagree).	5
3. The welfare state makes people nowadays less willing to look after themselves (Agree/Disagree).	5
4. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country (Agree/Disagree).	5
5. Which of these statements comes closest to your view: a) we can only be sure everyone's needs are met if the government provides the same services to all; b) the government should not provide services to those who can afford them.	2
6. Which of these statements comes closest to your view: a) government should control inflation even if it means higher unemployment; b) government should control unemployment even if it means higher inflation?	2
7. The government must do more to reduce the income gap between poor and rich Canadians (Agree/Disagree).	5
8. We must crack down on crime, even if it means that criminals lose their rights (Agree/Disagree).	5
9. Do you approve or disapprove of party quotas and affirmative action for women candidates?	4

TABLE A4
SURVEY ITEMS USED TO CONSTRUCT CANADIAN SOCIAL
CONSERVATISM IDEOLOGICAL SCALE

SOCIAL MORALITY SCALE	Categories
1. Which of the following positions on abortion is closest to your own: Never permitted... A woman's personal choice.	3
2. People today don't have enough respect for traditional values (Agree/Disagree).	5
3. The banning of pornographic films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards? (Agree/Disagree).	5
4. Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children (Agree/Disagree).	5
5. Homosexual couples should be allowed to get legally married? (Agree/Disagree).	5
6. Only people who are legally married should be having children (Agree/Disagree).	5
7. Respect for authority is one of the most important things that children should learn? (Agree/Disagree).	5